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MAPP GOES ABROAD
Craig M. Bradleyt
In Mapp v. Ohio,' the United States Supreme Court held that evi-
dence obtained by police in violation of the Fourth Amendment must
be excluded from state, as well as federal, criminal trials. In doing so,
the Court broke from common law tradition, as it had already done in
applying the exclusionary rule to the federal government.2  In Eng-
land the rule was, and had always been, that relevant evidence was
admissible, regardless of how it had been obtained.3 In general, with
the exception of coerced confessions, other countries followed the
non-exclusion approach prior to Mapp.4
Since Mapp, and partly because of it, the approach of the rest of
the world to evidentiary exclusion due to police misconduct is chang-
ing. It is no longer true, as Chief Justice Burger declared in 1971, that
the exclusionary rule is "unique to American Jurisprudence." 5 I have
been following the approaches of various countries to evidentiary ex-
clusion since 1982,6 culminating in a book published in 1999 which
discusses the criminal procedure rules of twelve different countries,
t Craig Bradley is the James Louis Calamaras Professor of Law, Indiana University
School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana. The author would like to thank Profs. David Feldman,
Simon Bronitt, Joachim Herrmann, and Thomas Weigend for their help in updating my informa-
tion on exclusionary practices in various countries and for their comments on earlier drafts.
' 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), on which Mapp was based, had explicitly
rejected the common law approach. See id. at 394 (holding that Fourth Amendment protection
extends to letters and papers taken from the accused's home by government officials).
3 See, e.g., Queen v. Leatham, 121 Eng. Rep. 589 (1861) (finding that evidence would be
admissible even if it was stolen).
4 See generally Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging International Consensus as to Criminal
Procedure Rules, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 171 (1993) [hereinafter Bradley, Emerging International
Consensus] (discussing the approaches taken in England, France, Canada, Australia, and Ger-
many). Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 415 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dis-
senting). This statement was not completely true then either. See infra note 6 and accompany-
ing text.
6 See Craig M. Bradley, Criminal Procedure in the 'Land of Oz': Lessons for America,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 99 (1990) (discussing Australia's balancing approach to the
exclusionary rule); Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4 (arguing that other
countries have adopted exclusionary requirements); Craig M. Bradley, The Exclusionary Rule in
Germany, 96 HARV. L. RV. 1032 (1983) [hereinafter Bradley, Exclusionary Rule in Germany)
(arguing that Germany applies a modified version of the exclusionary rule).
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including their rules regarding evidentiary exclusion. 7 This article will
discuss the similarities and differences between the American ap-
proach of Mapp and the approaches of these and other countries.
Hans Lensing, a law professor and judge in the Netherlands
summarizes the general state of affairs:
In most systems procedural sanctions, most notably ex-
clusion of evidence or something similar ("nullit6") may ap-
ply where the police or other agencies have obtained evi-
dence in an unlawful manner, either related to searches and
seizures or interrogation. In many of those systems the ra-
tionale is not deterrence of [police misconduct]-as it is in
the U.S.A-but fairness of the proceedings, the safeguarding
of the integrity in the administration of justice and the like
(inter alia Argentina, Canada, England and Wales, France,
Germany, Italy, South Africa and-but less clear-Russia).
However, in some systems (China, Israel) only considera-
tions of reliability determine whether evidence is admissible.
The U.S. system seems the most rigid system inasfar [sic]
as unlawfully obtained evidence must be excluded, and the
court does not have discretion whether to admit the evidence.
However, it should be noted that this does not mean that bal-
ancing of interests is absent: The exclusionary rule does not
apply to all kinds of police misconduct nor does it apply in
all kinds of proceedings. For example, the American exclu-
sionary rule does not apply in the grand jury or in deportation
proceedings. 8
On one point, all countries are in agreement, at least in theory: in-
voluntary confessions must be excluded. Beyond that, as Lensing in-
dicates, while evidentiary exclusion due to police misconduct fre-
quently occurs, the rationales and the rigor of exclusionary practices
vary greatly. There has been a very significant development in the
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Khan v. United King-
dom, 9 which will likely solidify the resistance of other countries to
America's mandatory exclusionary rule.
7 See generally CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY (Craig Bradley ed. 1999)
[hereinafter WORLDWIDE STUDY] (studying Argentina, Canada, China, England, France, Ger-
many, Israel, Italy, Russia, South Africa, Spain, and the United States). For the purposes of this
article, China and Russia, which do not have well-developed or consistent policies regarding
evidentiary exclusion have been eliminated, and Australia has been added.
8 Hans Lensing, General Comments, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 428.
9 No. 35394/97 (Eur. Ct. H.R. May 12, 2000), available at http://www.hudoc.
echr.coe.int/hudoc/default.htm.
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In Khan, the defendant had been stopped at Customs at Manches-
ter Airport after his arrival from Pakistan with another man, A, and
both were searched. Heroin was found on A, but not on Khan, who
was questioned and released. Several months later, Khan visited a
friend, B, in Sheffield. B was already under investigation for dealing
in heroin, and an electronic "bug" had surreptitiously been planted in
his house. Khan was recorded telling B that he was a co-conspirator
of A's in the Manchester smuggling. Khan was arrested. He moved to
suppress the recording on the ground that the bug was illegally
planted. The Crown admitted that there was no statutory system to
regulate police use of electronic listening devices. 1 Nevertheless, the
police had conformed to Home Office guidelines, which required that
such bugging should only occur if ordered by a Senior Constable.
The trial court determined that, despite the lack of statutory au-
thority, admission of the recording would not render the proceeding
"unfair," and admitted the tape." Khan was convicted solely on the
basis of the tape, and the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords
upheld his conviction.12 The House of Lords agreed with the defen-
dant that the surveillance had been in violation of Article 8 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, because it was not author-
ized by statute.1 3 Nevertheless, noting that the recording did not vio-
late British law, the Lords upheld the trial judge's finding that its use
did not render the trial unfair. 14
The European Court of Human Rights agreed that Article 8 was
violated. 15 They further considered whether Article 6, § 1, which
guarantees the right, in a criminal case, to a "fair and public hearing"
was violated.'
6
10 See id at *7 (noting that the Police Act of 1997 has since provided a statutory basis for
authorization of police surveillance).
1 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng.) (providing for the
exclusion of evidence if its use would have "an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceed-
ings.")
12 See Khan, No. 35394/97 at *3 (dismissing Khan's conviction appeal).
13 See id at *7 (noting that the evidence was obtained in violation of Article 8, and that
this was a relevant but non-determinative fact). Article 8 provides in § 1 that "Everyone has the
right to respect for his private.., life.., and his correspondence" and in § 2 that "There shall
be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accor-
dance with law and is necessary in a democratic society.., for the prevention of disorder or
crime .. " Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Apr.
11, 1950, Eur. T.S. No. 5.14 See Kan, No. 35394/97 at *4.
15 See id. at *7 (noting that due to the lack of a statutory system to regulate the use of
covert listening devices at the time the evidence was obtained, the collection of the evidence
was not in accordance with the law and therefore violated Article 8).
16 See id. at *7-8.
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The Court noted that in an earlier case, Schenk v. Switzerland, 17 it
had not ordered evidence excluded despite the fact that the electronic
surveillance had been illegal under Swiss law, 18 because the "trial as a
whole was fair."19 Further, the Court noted that the fact that the ques-
tioned evidence was essentially the government's whole case was not
determinative since "there was no risk of [the evidence] being unreli-
able."20 Likewise, the court concluded, by a vote of 6 to 1, that
Khan's trial was "fair" under Article 6, § 1, and that the evidence
need not have been excluded.21 It summarized its position:
It is not the role of the Court to determine, as a matter of
principle, whether particular types of evidence-for exam-
ple, unlawfully obtained evidence-may be admissible or,
indeed, whether the applicant was guilty or not. The ques-
tion.., is whether the proceedings as a whole, including the
way in which the evidence was obtained, were fair.22
Only Judge Loucaides disagreed on the ground that use of evi-
dence obtained in violation of Article 8 rendered the trial unfair by
definition.2 3 However, even in the United States, although such evi-
dence obtained without statutory authority, would have been manda-
torily excluded against B, Khan nevertheless would probably not have
been able to exclude it due to lack of standing.24
This article will summarize the state of exclusionary law in vari-
ous countries studied.
17 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988).
18 See id. at 28 (noting that the government admitted that the recording was unlawful).
19 Khan, No. 35394/97 at *9.
20 Id. at*10.
2' See id. at *10-11. The Court noted that it would have also been proper for the British
courts to have excluded the evidence, and awarded the defendant 11,500 British Pounds for
counsel fees. See id. at *9-10, 13.
22 Id. at *9.
23 See id. at *15 (stating that a trial cannot be "fair" if it is conducted in breach of the
law).
2 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that a business visitor who visits
a house solely to package cocaine lacks an expectation of privacy). It is not clear whether
Khan's visit was business or personal, or whether he was an overnight guest. Nor is it clear
whether Khan might have had standing because an electronic surveillance was involved. See
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 4.6(b) (3d ed. 2000) (discussing Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and noting that "in an eavesdropping case the parties to the conver-
sation and the persons with a possessory interest in the place where the conversation occurs all
have standing," but, "courts are inclined to define Title III standing as being exactly the same as
Fourth Amendment standing, even to the point of taking into account Fourth Amendment de-
velopments postdating enactment of Title I').
[Vol. 52:375
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I. ARGENTINA
Argentine criminal procedure is governed by a code, adopted in
1993, which "retains the basic features of criminal procedure shared
by most Continental legal systems influenced by French law."5 De-
spite early recognition of the principle that wrongly obtained evidence
should not be used at trial, 26 this idea was ignored until the 1980s. 27
However, following recognition by some lower courts of an exclu-
sionary principle in cases of illegal searches, the Supreme Court, in
the 1984 case of "Fiorentino," 28 suppressed incriminating evidence on
the ground that failure to object to a search was not a valid indication
of consent.29 This was found despite the absence of threats or vio-
lence on the part of the police.
In another case, "Rayford," 30 the Supreme Court took a somewhat
broader view of standing, similar to the view that the U.S. Supreme
Court takes, holding that when A confessed following an illegal, war-
rantless search of his home, his confession, which implicated his co-
defendant B, was not usable against either defendant. The drugs found
in A's home were likewise not admissible against either defendant.
In the United States, neither the drugs nor the confession would be
admissible against A, but both would be admissible against B due to
his lack of standing. Argentine procedure agrees, however, with that
of the U.S., that if the discovery of evidence was independent of the
illegality, or if the evidence would have been legally discovered de-
spite the illegality (inevitable discovery), then it can be used at trial.3 '
Carrio and Garro conclude that,
The exclusionary rule has been applied often enough by
intermediate appellate courts, especially in cases concerning
illegal possession of drugs, so as to have an impact on how
trial courts handle these cases. Whether these decisions have
2 Alejandro Carrio & Alejandro Garro, Argentina, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7,
at 3.
2 See id at 17 (discussing that the principle of excluding wrongly obtained evidence was
affirmed in the "Charles Hermanos" case of 1891).
27 See id. at 18 (noting that until 1980, cases subsequent to "Charles Hermanos" were
usuallr dismissed on the basis that illegal searches were not a constitutional issue).
Corte Suprema de Justicia del la Naci6n [CSJN] [Supreme Court] 306 Fallos 1752
(1985) (Arg.).
29 See Carrio & Garro, supra note 25, at 19 (discussing Fiorentino). In the 1981 case of
"Montenegro" CSJN 303 Fallos 1938 (1981) (Arg.), the Court suppressed physical evidence
that was found as a result of a coerced confession.
30 CSJN 308 Fallos 733 (1995) (Arg.).
31 See Carrio & Garro, supra note 25, at 22 (noting that Argentina courts distinguish be-
tween evidence that could have been obtained legitimately and that which could not).
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had a noticeable impact on every day police practices is diffi-
cult to ascertain .... 32
Although the authors don't specify, it seems clear that the exclu-
sionary decision is discretionary with the trial court. Thus, appellate
court decisions reversing convictions due to failure to suppress evi-
dence must be based on an abuse of discretion standard.33 Because of
this discretionary approach, based on a tradition of non-suppression, it
is obvious that many cases of illegal police behavior do not necessar-
ily result in suppression, and that many court decisions regarding ex-
clusion, both at the trial and appellate levels, are not reported, what-
ever the result. Nevertheless, as the authors point out, the Mapp prin-
ciple does seem to be having an impact.
If. AUSTRALIA
The leading Australian case is Bunning v. Cross,34 in which the
High Court of Australia expressly disavowed the common law non-
exclusion principle. 35  In Bunning, the court described the various
factors that might play into the trial judge's decision to exclude evi-
dence, such as whether the police misconduct was inadvertent or not,
the importance of the evidence, the seriousness of the offense, and the
ease with which the law might have been complied with.36
The 1995 case of Ridgeway v. The Queen37 expanded upon Bun-
ning and held that exclusion is to be ordered when "the public interest
in maintaining the integrity of the courts and in ensuring the obser-
vance of the law and minimum standards of propriety by those en-
trusted with powers of law enforcement" requires it.38 This, in turn,
will depend on "the nature, the seriousness and the effect of the illegal
[police] conduct," and whether it was "encouraged or tolerated" by
higher police authorities or by prosecutors.39 Significantly, however,
the High Court noted that, "[o]rdinarily... any unfairness to the par-
ticular accused will be of no more than peripheral importance." 4 It
32 Id. at 19-20 (footnote omitted).
33 See id. at 48 (noting that the appeal is received as a continuation of the one and only
criminal proceeding, and thus it is not viewed as a mechanism to reconsider an erroneous final
decision). Appeals may be brought by either party. See id. (noting that the prosecutor may
bring an appeal).
(1978) 141 C.L.R. 54 (Austl.).
3 See id. at 64-65.
36 See id. See also KErrH TRONC ET AL., SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND 330 (1996) (listing specific criteria that trial judges should use when deciding the
admissibility of evidence).
37 (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19 (Austl).
31 Id. at 38.
39 id.
40 id.
380 [Vol. 52:375
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remains the case that evidentiary exclusion due to police misconduct
is very much the exception, rather than the rule.
Indeed, despite the existence of fairly detailed rules governing
searches in the various states, 41 as well as a discretionary exclusion
policy, rules governing searches were generally ignored by the police,
because until the 1990s, evidence had never been excluded by the
High Court due to an illegal search.42 However, in the 1990 case of
George v. Rockett43 the High Court did suppress evidence seized in an
unlawful search. In that case, police in Queensland obtained a search
warrant based on an affidavit that simply stated that the police had
"reasonable grounds for suspicion' '44 without setting forth the basis.
The High Court, sitting in its capacity as the highest court of the state
of Queensland, held that the warrant was invalid and the evidence
must be suppressed. The Court ruled that the Queensland statute re-
quiring "reasonable grounds" meant that these grounds must be speci-
fied in the warrant affidavit.45  Likewise, in Ridgeway,46 the High
Court suppressed heroin found on the defendant because it had been
improperly supplied him by police.
As for interrogations, police are required to give Miranda-type
warnings as to silence and right to counsel47 "when the police have
sufficient evidence in their possession to justify a charge, even if they
have not decided to charge the suspect. ' '48 Thus, Miranda-type warn-
ings are required somewhat earlier in the process than they are re-
quired in the United States. However, failure to give the "caution"
does not necessarily lead to exclusion-it is simply a "matter to be
considered." 49 In four of the eight Australian states and territories,
41 See Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 192 (noting that most
Australian states have detailed search and arrest statutory rules).
42 See id. (noting that the fact that evidence from illegal searches had never been excluded
showed that the police did not take the laws seriously).
43 (1990) 93 A.L.R. 483 (Austl.).
44 See U at489.
41 See id.
46 Ridgeway v. The Queen, (1995) 184 C.L.R. 19,40 (Austl.).
47 It is not completely clear whether the warning includes the right to counsel in all states.
Counsel warnings are required by statute in four of the eights states and territories: The Com-
monwealth (federal government), Australian Capital Territory (A.C.T.), Victoria, and South
Australia. See 11 The Laws of Australia § 88 (1996). As of 1996, in the other four states, "the
caution" was apparently limited to warnings as to right to silence and that "anything you say
may be used against you." Id. However, the trend is in the direction of requiring counsel warn-
ings and it is likely that by now, either by statue or court decision, other states also require
counsel warnings.
48 Van der Meer v. The Queen, (1988) 82 A.L.R. 10, 18 (Austl.).
49 Laws of Australia, supra note 47, §§ 77-78. However, evidence has been excluded for
this reason "in several cases." See id. § 78 (citing cases in which evidence has been excluded
for failure to warn).
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interrogations must be tape-recorded. Failure to record is "likely to
lead to the exclusion of untaped confessions ... 
I. CANADA
Canada has the most fully developed exclusionary law of any
country studied outside of the United States. The Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms includes both a right against "unreasonable
search or seizure" 51 and a right, upon arrest or detention "to be in-
formed promptly of the reasons therefor; ' '52 and "to retain and instruct
counsel without delay and to be informed of that right., 53 Moreover,
the Charter provides that:
where.., a court concludes that evidence was obtained in a
manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guar-
anteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is
established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the admini-
stration of justice into disrepute.
Despite the discretionary nature of the Canadian exclusionary
rule,55 Professor Roach has set forth numerous examples of its use in
cases of both illegal searches and improperly obtained confessions. 6
There are two tests to determine if evidence should be excluded.
First, evidence will be excluded if it would affect the fairness of the
trial, and second, it will be excluded to "avoid judicial condonation of
a serious Charter violation.,
57
Under the first test, "evidence that could not be obtained but for
unconstitutional participation of the accused" should be excluded.
58
"This includes statements and other evidence such as hair, blood and
breath samples taken from the accused in violation of the right [to]
50 Id. § 112.
51 CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. II (Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms), § 8.
52 Id. § 10(a).
" Id. § 10(b).14 Id. § 24 (2).
55 I consider this to be a "discretionary" rule in the sense that exclusion does not follow
automatically from the finding of a constitutional violation. The Canadian Supreme Court, how-
ever, insists that § 24(2) "does not confer a discretion on the [trial] judge but a duty to admit or
exclude as a result of his finding [of disrepute]." The Queen v. Collins, [1987] 33 C.C.C. (3d)
1, 12 (Can.). The burden of establishing "disrepute," even after the finding of a Charter viola-
tion, is on the defendant. See Yves-Marie Morissette, The Exclusion of Evidence under the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do, 29 McGIL LJ.
521,538 (1984).
56 See Kent Roach, Canada, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 63 (giving examples
of the use of the Canadian exclusionary rule in varying contexts).
" Id. at 64.
58 Id.
[Vol. 52:375
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counsel.,59 It has also been applied to a gun to which the accused led
police who were interrogating him in violation of his right to counsel.
Thus, the concept of "fairness of the trial" has been broadly applied in
Canada to apply to more situations than simply that of a coerced, and
therefore inherently unreliable, confession.
Likewise, the "judicial condonation" prong has been used to ex-
clude real (i.e., physical) evidence, even though the police could have
obtained the evidence by legal means. 6° In fact, this circumstance can
cut against the police "by suggesting that the police could have done
their job without violating the accused's rights.",61 Examples of ex-
clusion include:
drugs [that] were seized by a choke hold when the police did
not have reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was a
drug handler; when drugs were seized through a defective
warrant and a no knock entry with excessive force; when
drugs were seized through an intrusive and unconstitutional
rectal search; when drugs were seized after a trespass without
reasonable grounds that the police ought to have known was
illegal and when bloody clothes and other evidence in a mur-
der case were seized after the police made a warrantless entry
and arrest in the accused's home without even a subjective
belief that they had grounds for an arrest .... 62
But while the Canadian courts are thus active in suppressing evi-
dence due to search violations by police, the cases discussed generally
involve more extreme police misbehavior than merely failing to get a
warrant when police have probable cause to search a house or arrest
someone on less than probable cause (though this is not invariably
true.)63 Professor Roach notes that "violations committed in good
faith" by police do not lead to exclusion64 Moreover, under the "judi-
cial condonation" approach (but not under the "fair trial" test), the
seriousness of the offense charged and the importance of the evidence
59 Id.
6 See id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 64-65 (footnotes omitted) (citing Canadian cases where real evidence has been
excluded because of police violations of search and seizure regulations).63 For example, in Kokesch v. The Queen [1990] C.C.C. 207 (Can.), the Court suppressed
the marijuana evidence due to a trespass onto the curtilage of the suspect's home which pro-
vided grounds (inter alia, the scent of marijuana) for the search warrant, because the trespass
violated clear statutory rules.
" Roach, supra note 56, at 64.
2001]
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to the prosecution's case may militate against exclusion,O contrary to
American law.
Because confessions involve the defendant being "conscripted
against himself,"66 Canadian law is somewhat stricter than American
law when it comes to both the defendant's rights and the police's fail-
ure to observe them. Upon arrest or "detention,' 67 the accused must
be informed of his right to silence 68 and counsel. If he asserts the
right to silence, he may not, unlike in America, be questioned by an
informant or undercover agent. 69 If he asserts his right to counsel,
"the police must facilitate access to counsel by offering the use of a
telephone .... The police must hold off eliciting evidence until the
suspect has had a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel., 70 "Most
provinces have established toll free telephone numbers that allow de-
tainees to contact duty counsel on a twenty four hour basis."7' How-
ever, unlike in America, once the suspect has spoken to counsel, the
police may resume questioning without counsel being present,72 and
may also "lie and engage in deception in order to obtain state-
ments. ' 73
Confessions obtained in violation of the above rules, as well as
real evidence discovered as a result of such confessions, are generally
excluded. 74 There have been only a few exceptions to this "general
presumption," such as where the accused has been "too intoxicated to
exercise his right to counsel or had an irresistible desire to confess." 75
65 See id. at 65 (noting that "[b]efore evidence is excluded under the second, 'serious
violation' test (but not the first 'fair trial' test), courts will consider the effects of excluding the
evidence on the repute of the administration ofjustice").
66 Collins v. The Queen [1987] C.C.C. 1, 3 (Can.).
67 This term is broader than "custody" (arrest) in America, and has been held to include a
"brief 5 minute detention in the back of a police car," and detention at a sobriety checkpoint.
Roach, supra note 56, at 68-69. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (finding that
warnings are not required during a traffic stop).
6" See Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 198 (quoting the
Supreme Court of Canada which held in The Queen v. Herbert, 77 C.R. (3d) 145, 146, that "the
most important function of legal advice upon detention is to ensure that the accused understands
his rights, chief among which is his right to silence").
69 See id. at 198-99. (observing that the Supreme Court of Canada, in Herbert, also noted
that "statements made to passive undercover agents, to real prisoners who are not police agents,
or overheard by a listening device would still be admissible") (footnote omitted).
70 Roach, supra note 56, at 69.
71 Id. at 68-69.
72 See id. at 69. But see Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990) (holding that police
may not further interrogate a suspect after he has consulted with counsel unless counsel is pre-
sent).
73 Roach, supra note 56, at 70.
74 See id. at70-71.
75 Id. at 71 (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 52:375
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IV. ENGLAND AND WALES 76
Criminal procedure in England is governed by the detailed Police
and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, PACE, which is elaborated by
various Codes of Procedure.77 Under PACE, England has search and
seizure laws similar to those of the United States,78 although Eng-
land's interrogation laws are stricter than those of the U.S., requiring
Miranda-type warnings as soon as there are "grounds to suspect of an
offense" rather than after the suspect is "in custody."79
Moreover, unlike the fictitious "right to counsel" in the U.S.,
PACE requires that a "Duty Solicitor" be available, and that the sus-
pect be told of this. Finally, as of 1991, tape recording of interroga-
tions is required where practicable.
80
There are four possible grounds of exclusion under PACE. Sec-
tion 76(2) requires exclusion of confessions (a) obtained "by oppres-
sion" or (b) likely to have been rendered "unreliable" by anything
said or done by anyone.81 Section 78(1) further provides that "the
court may refuse to allow evidence ... if it appears... that.., the
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it."82 Fi-
nally, § 82(3) "saves pre-existing common law powers... to exclude
evidence whose prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value., 83
Professor David Feldman has summarized the English practice on
evidentiary exclusion when an illegal search has occurred:
English law has no general exclusionary rule for improp-
erly obtained evidence. Instead, it distinguished [sic] be-
tween confessions by the accused and other evidence. The
fact that evidence has been obtained by improper or unlawful
means does not necessarily (or, except in relation to confes-
sions, even usually) make evidence of the discovery inadmis-
sible or excluded at trial. The judge has a discretion to ex-
clude real evidence obtained in the course of a search if that
76 Because Scotland and Northern Ireland have separate criminal procedure systems, this
section is properly called "England and Wales" not "Great Britain" or the "United Kingdom."
77 See Michael Zander, THE POLICE AND CRIMINAL EVIDENCE Acr 1984 (2d ed. 1990)
(discussing the Act and providing statutory text).
78 See generally Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 176-91
(comparing the search and seizure laws of England and the United States).
'
9 See Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, and Questioning of Persons by Po-
lice Officers, 1991, ch. C, para. 10.1 (Eng.).
80 See Code of Practice on Tape Recording, 1988, ch. E, para. 3.1 (Eng.).
81 See Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, ch. 60, § 76(2) (Eng.).12 Id. § 78(l).
83 David Feldman, Regulating Treatment of Suspects in Police Statiops: Judicial Interpre-
tations of Detention Provisions in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, 1990 CRIM. L.
REV. 452,453.
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in all the circumstances admitting it would make the proceed-
ings unfair.84
Indeed, only a few examples of exclusion of "real" (as opposed to
confessional) evidence may be found.85
When it comes to confessions, however, the English courts have
become quite strict. Police are required to warn suspects, in essen-
tially identical terms as Miranda,86 whenever they have "grounds to
suspect of an offense." 87 These warnings must be conveyed both
orally and in writing,88 although police may further inform the suspect
that his silence may be used against him at trial.8 9 The suspect must
further be informed of the availability of a "duty solicitor" free of
charge.9° Moreover, interviews conducted at police stations must be
tape-recorded. 91
As always, violations of these rules do not necessarily result in
evidentiary exclusion. "For a breach of the Codes to lead to exclusion
it must be significant and substantial."92 However, "[f]ailure to cau-
tion a suspect and wrongful refusal of access to legal advice are seri-
ous and substantial breaches, 93 and thus will usually lead to exclu-
sion of the suspect's statement. Likewise, failure to tape record a
statement will generally lead to exclusion. 94
84 David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 105.
8- See id. It is "relatively unusual" for a judge to exclude real evidence. For example, a
recent decision of the House of Lords found that "it was not improper for a trial judge to admit
evidence obtained by ... police trespass [into] the house of a non-consenting third party, be-
cause the public interest in detecting... serious crime... outweighed the interest in privacy."
Id. See also Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 189-90 (citing Matrto
v. Wolverhampton Crown Court, [1987] R.T.R. 337 (D.C.) (Eng.), where the breath specimen of
a suspect was suppressed because of his earlier unlawful arrest, and Queen v. Conway, 1990
CRIM. L. REV. 402, where a conviction was reversed because no lineup had been held as re-
quired by law).
86 See Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 183-84 (discussing
that the English Interrogation Code defines the "obligation of the police to inform suspects of
their rights").
87 Id. at 186 (quoting the English Code of Practice for the Detention, Treatment, and
Questioning of Persons by Police Officers, 1991, ch. C, para 10.1 (Eng.)).
88 See Michael Zander, The Act in the Station, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES AND
PROPRIETIES 123, 126 (John Benyon & Colin Bourne eds., 1986) (discussing the effect of the
Act on police procedures in the stationhouse).
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See David Ashby, Safeguarding the Suspect, in THE POLICE: POWERS, PROCEDURES
AND PROPRIETIES 183, 187-88 (John Benyon & Colin Bourne eds., 1986) (discussing the sec-
tion of the Act which safeguards suspects in police custody).
92 Feldman, supra note 84, at 113.
93 Id. at 114.
94 See id. (noting that "failure to comply with the recording provisions will be likely to
undermine the court's faith in the police evidence so as to make it unfair to admit the evidence"
(footnote omitted)).
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V. FPANCE
The French system is, to an American observer, disturbingly
vague.95 In part, this is because the French repose a good deal of trust
in the "investigating judge" who is in charge of criminal investiga-
tions. Professor Frase has described the "rules" pertaining to searches:
during an investigation of a "flagrant 96 offense, police, prosecutors,
or investigating judges may search the scene as well as the domicile
of "all 'persons who appear to have participated' in the offense, or
(who appear) 'to be in possession of papers or objects relating to' the
crime, and seize any evidence useful to the manifestation of the truth
S.. ."97 Domicile searches are subject to limitations as to time of day,
[and] requirements for the presence of... [a] non-police witness, ....
however, no warrant is req9uired, and it is not clear what degree of
suspicion is required...
Likewise, during investigation of non-flagrant offenses, the inves-
tigating judge or his delegate (i.e., the police) may also search houses,
apparently with no particular degree of suspicion. "The French pro-
cedure code does not expressly regulate searches of places other than
houses .... However, French courts have applied some of the Proce-
dure Code's restrictions on domicile searches to other searches and
seizures. For example, hotel rooms and private offices are treated the
same as domiciles ... 99
Professor Frase further points out that violations of "[t]he safe-
guards applicable to domicile searches" and "some of the limitations
applied to identity checks and wiretapping" give rise to a mandatory
evidentiary exclusion. 1° However, the "rules" are so lax that it's not
surprising that such cases of mandatory exclusion are rare.
Frase continues:
[M]ost violations give rise to exclusion only if they are
deemed to have violated "substantial" provisions of the Code
.... [E]xclusion further requires the court to find that the
violation has caused "harm to the interests of the party that it
95 The dubious investigative practices in France are to be contrasted to the trial, which
contains many features that seem admirable. Of course, if the defendant's rights have already
been trampled by police, a "good" trial may not be of much value. For an excellent description
of a French murder trial, see Renee Lettow Lemer, The Intersection of Two Systems: An Ameri-
can on Trial for an American Murder in the French Cour d'Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791.
96 This is limited to major felonies and jailable offenses. See Richard S. Frase, France, in
WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 149. "[A] flagrant offense investigation conveys a wide
variety of temporary detention, interrogation, search, and seizure powers .... " Id.
97 Id. at 153 (quoting portions of Article 54 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure).
98 Id.
99 Id. at 154 (footnote omitted).
100 Id. at 155 (footnotes omitted).
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concerns." However, when the violation affects important
public interests . . . ro showing of prejudice or defendant
"standing" is required .... [T]rial courts have very limited
authority to exclude evidence in cases subject to judicial in-
vestigation. 01
Interrogations are likewise unlikely to be hindered by an exclu-
sionary sanction. While "French authorities are expected to avoid the
use of unfair, brutal or deceptive methods, . . . French courts have
traditionally been lax in controlling the use of psychological pressure
,,102
French police are "required" to inform the suspect that the inter-
rogation is limited to twenty-four hours (with the possibility of an
extension up to forty-eight hours in certain cases), to have his family
informed that he is being held, and to be examined by a doctor or the
prosecutor on demand. 103 Only after twenty hours of interrogation
1 4
is the suspect allowed to "speak in private and 'without delay' with an
attorney, for up to 30 minutes. 105 There is no warning as to the right
to silence, although the police have no legal power to compel the sus-
pect to talk.106 After charging, the suspect may be further questioned
in court by the investigating judge, but only with his consent in the
presence of counsel. 107
Breach of these undemanding formalities in the post-charge set-
ting does frequently give rise to discretionary exclusion at trial. Pre-
charge police interrogations, by contrast, "rarely" give rise to exclu-
sion. 108 Recently, however, the highest court has held that extending
the interrogation for more than forty-eight hours resulted in a "pre-
sumption" of prejudice, and hence exclusion. 1°9 Lower courts have
also excluded confessions where the police failed to "grant appropri-
0t' Id. at 155-56 (footnotes omitted) (quoting portions of the French Code of Criminal
Procedure). Unlike in Germany where evidence remains in the dossier, in France, excluded
evidence is actually removed from the dossier used by the court at trial. See id. See also Brad-
ley, Exclusionary Rule in Germany, supra note 6, at 1063 (describing German criminal proce-
dure which allows the presiding judge to "prepare[ I the case in advance by reading through the
entire file, including evidence that has been or will be 'excluded' from use at trial").
102 Frase, supra note 96, at 161.
103 See id. at 158.
104 This is not true for certain crimes, including extortion, "aggravated pimping," drug, and
terrorism cases where this right may be postponed to thirty-six or even seventy-two hours into
the interrogation. See id- at 159.
'05 Id. at 158.
106 See id. at 158-59.
107 See id. at 160.
'08 See id. at 162 (citing the French cases declining to exclude pre-charge police interroga-
tions made under varying circumstances).
'09 See id.
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ate access to counsel after 20 hours of detention."110 Professor Frase
terms these developments a "dramatic shift in French law" which
"appears to reflect two watershed developments in 1993: The clear
legislative intent to increase the rights of suspects during police ques-
tioning, and a decision of the Constitutional Council which declared
that the right to consult an attorney after 20 hours forms part of the
constitutionally protected 'rights of the defense.""'1
VI. GERMANY
Professor Thomas Weigend summarizes the German stance on
evidentiary exclusion, which is similar in its general approach to that
of the rest of Europe, but more specific and demanding than the gen-
eral approach in France:
There is no general exclusionary rule that would make
illegally obtained evidence inadmissible. Para. 136a section
3 CCP 2 does provide for [the] inadmissibility of statements
elicited by certain forbidden means .... In other instances of
violations of procedural rules by law enforcement personnel,
German courts weigh the seriousness of the violation against
the public interest in determining the truth.
1 3
It is a particularly interesting aspect of the German system that,
while evidence is not necessarily excluded due to police misconduct,
the fact that the police behaved properly does not guarantee its admis-
sion. Thus, in one case, 114 a diary was suppressed in a perjury charge,
even though it had been legally obtained by the police, 115 on the
ground that its use in court would violate the defendant's constitu-
tional right to privacy. However, the court added that, had this been a
murder case, the diary might have been admissible."
6
It also must be noted that "exclusion" in Germany does not mean
that the finder of fact is not aware of the excluded evidence. To the
110 Id. (discussing T.G.I. D'Aix-en-Provence, Dec. 22, 1993, D. [1994] 40,566).
11 Id. (footnote omitted).
112 § 136a Nr. I, 111 STRAFPROZEBORDNUNG [STPO] (F.R.G.) (providing that "[tihe free-
dom of the accused to determine and exercise his will shall not be impaired by ill-treatment, by
fatigue, by physical interference, by dispensing medicines, by torture, by deception or by hyp-
nosis .... Statements which were obtained in violation of these prohibitions may not be used
even if the accused agrees to said use").
113 Thomas Weigend, Germany, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 195.
114 Entscheidungen desBundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen [BGHSt] 19,325 (F.R.G.).
115 It was voluntarily handed over by the defendant's spouse.
116 See Bradley, Emerging International Consensus, supra note 4, at 212. Indeed, in a later
murder case, the court held that a diary was admissible because it "contained descriptions of the
writer's feelings toward others and therefore went beyond pure introspection." Weigend, supra
note 113, at 196 n.39 (citing Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 80,
(1989), 367 (373-83) (F.R.G.)).
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contrary, the "excluded" evidence remains in the dossier used at trial,
with the judges and lay judges enjoined to "ignore" it. Exclusion sim-
ply means that "excluded" evidence must not be included in the writ-
ten justification that must accompany every verdict.' 17 Therefore,
such reliance on excluded evidence in the written justification, ex-
press or suggested, may be the basis of reversal on appeal.
Weigend notes that although the Federal Court of Appeals (which
is the highest court for most criminal appeals) has in one case "re-
fused to give hard and fast rules on the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidence, it noted that violation of a rule which has the purpose of
safeguarding the defendant's basic procedural rights normally leads to
exclusion."'1 8 This observation was made in regard to § 136 of the
CCP, which requires police to inform suspects of the charge against
them, and of their rights to silence and counsel." 9 In the above-
mentioned case, the Federal Court of Appeals approved the state
court's exclusion of an unwarned confession. l20 Thus, it appears that
exclusion is mandatory for failure to give the silence warning, and
although not mandatory, exclusion is usual for failure to give the
counsel warning.1
Given the prohibition of § 136a on the use of deceit by police, and
the mandatory exclusion of any confession so obtained, the German
rules are, in this respect, somewhat more restrictive than those of the
U.S., where the Supreme Court has never forbidden police deceit.122
However, in practice, the German courts are not consistent in exclud-
ing confessions due to police rule breaking. 
123
When it comes to searches, exclusion depends on "the grievous-
ness of the violation (which is greater when law enforcement officers
17 See Bradley, Exclusionary Rule in Germany, supra note 6, at 1063; Weigend, supra
note 113, at 197-98.
118 Weigend, supra note 113, at 196 (discussing BGHSt 38, 214).
19 § 136 Nr. 1 STPO (F.R.G.) ("[T]he accused shall be informed of the act with which he
is charged and of the applicable penal provisions. It shall be pointed out to him that the law
grants him the right to respond to the accusation, or not to answer regarding the charge, and at
all times, even before his examination, to consult with defense counsel of his choice.").
120 BGHSt 38, 214 (F.R.G.). The Court cited Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
and noted that Britain, France, Denmark, Italy, and the Netherlands also excluded such un-
warned confessions.
121 See Weigend, supra note 113, at 204, and cases cited therein.
122 However, while the German Federal Court of Appeals forbids direct falsehoods, it does
not consider that "withholding of available information even if the effect is deceptive" requires
exclusion. Id. at 202.
123 See Joachim Herrmann, Das Recht des Beschuldigten, vor der polizeilichen Verneh-
mung einen Verteidiger zu befragen: Der BGH spricht mit gespaltener Zunge [The Right of the
Accused to Consult Counsel Prior to Interrogation: The Court of Appeals Speaks With a
Forked Tongue], NEUE ZErrSCHRIFT FOR STRAFREcHT [NStZ] 209 (1997) (discussing two cases
in which the police did not help the accused, who had asserted his right to counsel to contact his
counsel, and went on to extract an uncounselled confession from him-in one case the Court
excluded the confession, and in the other it did not).
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act in conscious disregard of the law), the importance of the individ-
ual interest infringed upon, the relevance of the piece of evidence for
the resolution of the case, and the seriousness of the offense."1 24 Evi-
dence obtained by an illegal search is "usually held admissible in
criminal proceedings."'12 For example, evidence obtained in violation
of the search warrant requirement has been held admissible if there
would have been an adequate basis for a warrant had the police ap-
plied for one,126 thus rendering the search warrant "requirement"
somewhat ineffective. However, as noted above, such evidence may
be excluded if its use would interfere with the accused's right of pri-
vacy.
VII. ISRAEL
Professors Eliahu Harnon and Alex Stein observe that "Israeli
courts have continually ruled that illegally obtained evidence is ad-
missible, subject to three statutory exceptions: [i]nvoluntary confes-
sions .... [i]nformation obtained through unlawful eavesdropping...
[and] [i]nformation obtained by an unlawful infringement of pri-
vacy." 27 The authors note that, while this latter rule "could have a
significant impact on the development of a broad exclusionary rule" it
has not been so interpreted. 12 "Instead, it has been limited to the in-
formational type of privacy, which made it inapplicable in cases in-
volving police brutality, as well as in most cases that involve illegal
searches."' 129 However, the authors suggest that this approach "may be
undergoing revision," and note:
There is growing academic literature urging courts to inter-
pret the Israeli Constitution as embodying an exclusionary
rule. Following this literature, the District Court of Nazareth
has recently ruled inadmissible a voluntary confession not
preceded by an adequate police warning that ought to have
informed the suspect about his basic rights. Furthermore,...
the trial court has the power to dismiss an entire indictment
"in the interests of justice," if it finds the indictment to be
'24 Weigend, supra note 113, at 196.
125 Id.
126 See id. (citing a case, BGHSt 40, 1741 (1744), in which the court held that evidence
should not be excluded if "the judge would, on a proper motion, have authorized the search and
if the objects found were otherwise admissible'). But see Bradley, Emerging International Con-
sensus, supra note 4, at 212-14 (providing examples of evidence being suppressed due to illegal
searches).
127 Eliahu Harnon & Alex Stein, Israel, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 230-31.
'28 Id. at231.
129 Id.
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based upon evidence that was obtained by violation of the
accused's constitutional rights.
130
However, the harshness of this remedy suggests that it will not of-
ten be employed. The authors predict that a Canadian-style discre-
tionary exclusionary rule is likely to be developed, "as opposed to the
American law that adopted a rigid exclusionary rule qualified by a
limited number of exceptions."
131
VIII. ITALY
In its 1989 criminal code revision, Italy adopted a more accusato-
rial system of criminal procedure that sought to codify "many aspects
of the American Supreme Court's 'criminal procedure revolution' of
the 1960's.,,132 This includes fairly detailed rules governing searches,
and especially, confessions.
Article 191 of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure flatly de-
clares, "evidence acquired in violation of prohibitions established by
law may not be used."133 Indeed, it further provides that "the parties
may raise this issue at any stage in the proceedings and that the judge,
sua sponte may declare evidence unusable. ' 134 But, Professor Van-
Cleave observes, "[d]espite this broad language, in practice this pro-
vision has limited effect. 1 35 This is because:
First... there are a number of special laws which allow the
police to conduct searches and seizures on their own initia-
tive .... Second, interpretations by the Supreme Court have
narrowed the application of this provision in the context of
searches and seizures by finding that the sanction only ap-
plies where there has been a violation of an express and spe-
cific prohibition. While it is well established that evidence
obtained by torture or other violation of personal dignity is
excluded from consideration for purposes of judgment, it is
130 Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Katz v. Attorney General, (delivered by the Supreme
Court on May 21, 1997, and not yet published)).
131 Id.
132 Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial System
of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 246 (1991).
See also, Elisabetta Grande, Italian Criminal Justice: Borrowing and Resistance, 48 AM. J.
COMP. L. 227, 227 (2000) (describing Italian criminal procedure as "an adversarial mode mod-
eled upon practices in the United States").
133 CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE [C.P.P.] art. 191(1) (Italy).
134 Rachel VanCleave, Italy, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 258 (citing C.P.P. art.
191(2)).
135 Id.
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unclear the extent to which an illegally performed search af-
fects evidence subsequently seized.1
36
In particular, "the great bulk of the American exclusionary rules
in the search and seizure area, together with the doctrine known as the
'fruit of the poisonous tree,' has been rejected in the Italian model."' 137
Italian courts use the argument that searches and seizures are inde-
pendent of each other and, if police find evidence, they are obliged to
seize it, even if the search was illegal. 138 Only if the seizure was ille-
gal (e.g. accomplished with undue violence) must the evidence be
suppressed. One panel of the Supreme Court has, however, departed
from this approach and excluded documents discovered by means of
an illegal search.
139
Similar to the rules of other European countries, the breach of
confession rules are more likely to have exclusionary consequences.
According to Professor VanCleave, upon arrest or detention, a suspect
must be warned of his right to silence, 140 and invited "to name a de-
fense attorney or to have counsel appointed. 141 The police must then
notify counsel of the questioning before it occurs and the defense at-
torney must be present during the questioning."' 142 Appointed counsel
must be arranged for those who don't have a lawyer. 'There is noth-
ing to indicate that a suspect may waive the right to have counsel pre-
sent."'143 Uncounselled statements may not be used against the sus-
pect. 144 Even spontaneous statements made after warnings, but in the
absence of counsel, may be used only to impeach, or for investigatory
purposes.
45
However, as Professor Grande has noted, "exclusionary rules are
not aimed at insulating the trier of fact from the impact of the inad-
missible evidence. '' 146 Rather, concurrent with the German ap-
136 Id. at 258-59 (footnotes omitted).
137 Grande, supra note 132, at 249.
138 See VanCleave, supra note 134, at 259.
139 See id. (citing Cass., V, 23 May 1992, ord. 899, which held that "where the decree for
the search was wholly lacking any reasons supporting the search, the subsequent seizure of
documents discovered during a residential search was also illegitimate.").
140 See id. at 263.
141 Id. (footnote omitted).
142 Id. (footnote omitted). Non-suspects must also be warned by the police prior to ques-
tioning. See id.
,4-1 Id. at 264.
144 See id. (noting that "[w] here a suspect makes statements in the absence of counsel, such
statements may not be used at trial except for purposes of impeachment").
145 See id.
146 Grande, supra note 132, at 247.
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proach,147 "excluded" evidence is only excluded from the written
judgement. 148
IX. SOUTH AFRICA
In close resemblance to other countries discussed, in South Af-
rica, "[s]earch and seizure without a warrant is only exceptionally
permitted," according to Professors Schwikkard and van der
Merwe.149 "A search warrant may be issued by a magistrate or justice
of the peace who, after considering information on oath, has reason-
able grounds for believing that an article, which can be of use in prov-
ing a criminal case, is in the possession or under the control or upon
any person or upon or at any premises [including vehicles] within his
area of jurisdiction." 150 However, since police officers are also jus-
tices of the peace,1 51 it is unclear what the force of this limitation may
be.
South Africa further recognizes consent and exigent circum-
stances as exceptions to the warrant requirement, with the state being
required to establish these exceptions. "If... it is found that there
was no urgency or immediate risk of destruction of vital evidence, the
conduct of the police officer would generally be considered unreason-
able.", 15
2
Interrogations of detainees or arrestees must be preceded by ad-
vice of rights resembling the Miranda warnings. 153 However, it is not
clear whether the police are required to contact counsel should the
suspect so request. "Evidence elicited during an interrogation that has
not been preceded by the requisite warning will run the risk of exclu-
sion.'154 At this time, there has been no reported case on exclusion;
however, the idea of excluding evidence due to police misconduct is
alive in South Africa. Professors Schwikkard and van der Merwe
explain:
147 See Weigend, supra note 113, at 197-98.
148 See Grande, supra note 132, at 247-48.
149 pj. Schwikkard & S.E. van der Merwe, South Africa, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra
note 7, at 331.
15o Id.
151 See id. at 327.
152 Id. at 332.
153 See id. at 338 (summarizing the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, the
Criminal Procedure Act, and the Judge's Rules, and finding that "whenever a person is arrested
or detained she must be promptly advised of her right: to remain silent; the consequences of not
remaining silent; the right to consult with a legal practitioner; and that if she cannot afford the
services of a legal practitioner that she may apply for legal aid and that a legal practitioner will
be assigned to her if substantial injustice would otherwise result").
154 Id.
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It took South African courts many years to come to the
conclusion that evidence obtained in breach of the rules that
govern arrest, search and seizure, should as a rule be ex-
cluded. For several decades they had admitted such evidence
on the basis of the general English common law rule that
relevance is the test for admissibility and that a court should
therefore not be concerned with the manner in which the evi-
dence has been procured ....
However, immediately prior to constitutionalization [in
1996] there was a sudden judicial awareness of the danger of
indirectly permitting the state and its officials to obtain evi-
dence in an illegal manner.1 55
The authors cite S. v Hammer156as an example. In that case, an
eighteen-year-old accused asked police for permission to write a letter
to his mother. The police agreed, but then gave the letter to the
prosecutor. The court excluded the letter from evidence both as a
breach of the accused's right to privacy, and because it had been un-
fairly obtained. While the police may have been allowed to read the
letter for security purposes, they were not allowed to hand it over to
the prosecutor.
In another case, a warrantless search of a room sublet by the ac-
cused from one M was declared invalid because only M, not the ac-
cused, had consented.157 Bloody banknotes found in the accused's
music system were suppressed. The court explicitly rejected the rigid
rule of Mapp, but, relying on the Irish case of People v. O'Brien,1
58
concluded that the evidence should be excluded because of the "con-
scious and deliberate violation of the accused's right to privacy in the
absence of any extraordinary circumstances."' 59
These cases predated the present Constitution which specifically
provides that evidence "obtained in a manner that violates any right in
the Bill of Rights must be excluded if the admission of that evidence
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the ad-
ministration of justice.'' 6 The authors note that since this language
was adopted from the Canadian Constitution, "[ilt is to be expected
155 Id. at 333.
156 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C) (S. Afr.).
157 See Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 149, at 334 (discussing S v Motloutsi,
1996 (1) SACR 78 (C) (S. AFr.)).
151 [1965] I.R. 142 (Jr.).
159 See Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 149, at 334.
'60 S. AFR. CONST. § 35(5).
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that Canadian decisions on this point will be useful to South African
courts in their interpretation of [this provision]."' 161
In a recent article, Professor van der Merwe discusses other
timely cases in which evidence has been excluded due to police
misconduct. 162 In S v Naidoo,163 the police gave a judge false
information in seeking a wiretapping warrant. The trial judge
excluded the evidence on the ground that its use would render the trial
unfair. He further found that use of the evidence would be detrimental
to the interests of justice:
[The Constitution affirms] the Legislature's commitment to
the concept of protection of private communications against
violation or infringement. To countenance the violations in
this case would leave the general public with the impression
that the courts are prepared to condone serious failures by the
police to observe the laid-down standards of investigation so
long as a conviction results....
The robbery in question has been referred to as the biggest
robbery in the history of South Africa. There may be those
members of the public who will regard the exclusion of the
evidence as being evidence of undue leniency towards crimi-
nals. The answer to that is that crime in this country cannot
be brought under control unless we have an efficient, honest,
responsible and respected police for~e, capable of enforcing
the law. One of the mistakes which must be learnt from the
past is that illegal methods of investigation are unacceptable
and can only bring the administration of justice into disre-
pute, particularly when they impinge upon the basic human
rights which the Constitution seeks to protect. 6"
Likewise, in a recent confession case,165 the police informed the
accused's attorney that the accused would make statements at two
o'clock p.m. The attorney planned to meet with his client before the
two p.m. statements, and when the attorney arrived, he was informed
161 Schwikkard & van der Merwe, supra note 149, at 335.
162 See S.E. Van der Merwe, The 'Good Faith' of the Police and the Exclusion of
Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence, I 1 S. AFR. J.°CRIM. JUST. 462 (1998).
163 1998 (1) BCLR 46 (D).
164 Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
165 S v. Mphala, 1998 (4) BCLR 494 (W) (S. Afr.).
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that confessions had already been given. The trial court excluded the
confessions on the ground of unfairness. 166
In a third case, S v Soci,167 the trial judge excluded the identifica-
tion of the suspect by a witness because of the police did not inform
the accused that he had the immediate right to consult with a legal
practitioner. This goes beyond Miranda, which would only require
the suppression of a statement, not a witness identification. Oddly,
however, the judge admitted the confession. 68
These are trial court decisions. No doubt, other trial court deci-
sions could be found with opposite holdings on similar facts. This is
the nature of a discretionary exclusion regime. In years to come,
however, appellate and High Court decisions will likely begin to flesh
out the circumstances of when police misconduct renders the trial
"unfair."
X. SPAIN
Professor Richard Vogler summarizes the position of Spanish law
on evidentiary exclusion:
This area of the law has undergone radical changes over
the last two decades under the influence of anglo-american
law and the need to restrict the hitherto unregulated powers
of the police. Article 11 of the [code of criminal procedure]
lays down the principle that "evidence obtained either di-
rectly or indirectly in contravention of fundamental rights
and liberties will be of no effect." This provision has been
held to apply to the guarantees set out in... the Constitution.
Evidence obtained unlawfully will therefore be declared a
nullity, references to it will be removed from the dossier and
it cannot be referred to in the proceedings. The police offi-
cers or others involved may face disciplinary or penal sanc-
tions. 1
69
Professor Vogler continues: "A means of proof is unlawful when
it is obtained in breach of a fundamental right, for example, a search
without a warrant or other justification, a telephone tap carried out
without authority or the use of physical or psychological torture dur-
ing an interrogation."'
170
166 See id
167 1998 (3) BCLR 376 (E) (S. Af.).
168 See also S v Ngwenya, 1999 (3)'BCLR 308 (W) (holding that the failure to warn a
suspect of his right to counsel did not invalidate a lineup).
169 Richard Vogler, Spain, in WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 7, at 381 (footnote omitted).
170 Id.
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Spanish law declares that the "home is inviolable," and continues
that "[n]o-one may enter or search a domicile without the consent of
the owner or a judicial warrant, except in cases offlagrante delito.' 7'
This exception seems to be limited to true emergencies "when the
officers directly perceive the alleged wrongdoing and not when, for
example, information received leads them to a particular premises."1
72
Vogler further notes that protection "extends to tents, caravans, and
hotels," but not to public buildings. 173
Professor Vogler describes the Spanish Constitutional Court's
protection of domiciles from searches to be "admirably robust"'174 and
notes that, in 1993, the Constitutional Court struck down, over fervent
police objection, a provision of the code of criminal procedure that
had allowed warrantless searches of homes on "'firm evidence to be-
lieve' that a drug-related offence was being committed there."
1 75
However, he qualifies this by noting inconsistency in the application
of the nullity (exclusionary) rule. He notes that one line of cases
holds that items discovered in searches that go beyond the scope of
the warrant are inadmissible, whereas another line allows such items
to be used. 1
76
As for interrogations, upon arrest, the arrestee must be informed
of the reason for his arrest, of his right to silence or to insist on an-
swering only to the Examining Magistrate. 177 He must further be in-
formed of his right to counsel and of the availability of a duty lawyer
provided by the bar.
178
The lawyer is entitled to be present at the interrogation
(which cannot commence until either the lawyer arrives or
eight hours have elapsed since the call-out) .... A failure to
observe any of the above formalities will result in nullifica-
tion (i.e., the removal of the offending documents from the
file and non-use at trial) ....
1 Id. at 379 (quoting SPAIN CONST. art. 18.2).
172 Id.
173 Id. (footnote omitted).
174 Id. at 380. This is in contrast to a 1992 law that gives police broad authority to stop and
frisk people in public places, and to search vehicles, with no level of particularized suspicion
required. See id. at 376.
175 Id. at 380.
176 See id. at 382.
177 See id. at 377.
178 Id. at 377.
179 Id. at 378.
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However, it is not clear to what extent this rigorous regime is ac-
tually being followed. Professor Vogler notes that "abuses of these
procedures are still evident." 180
CONCLUSION
In sum, it appears that Miranda has had a profound effect on
other countries. Warnings similar to the Miranda warnings are al-
most universally required. In some countries, the police must warn
suspects sooner than Miranda requires, and some police are actually
required to provide counsel when the suspect asks for it, contrary to
Miranda which only requires that "interrogation must cease."'
81
But this is not a symposium of the University of Arizona Law
School about the forthcoming 40& Anniversary of Miranda. Rather,
it is of an Ohio law school about Mapp. As to this case, the returns
are more mixed. Mapp may be considered as having two compo-
nents. First, the abrogation of the common law rule that the method
by which evidence is obtained is irrelevant to the issue of whether it
should be excluded. The illegality of the search or seizure of evi-
dence is now a relevant consideration in determining its admissibility.
In this respect, Mapp has been largely adopted. Other countries have
rules governing searches and seizures, and agree that police violation
of those rules may lead to evidentiary exclusion.
By contrast, the second component of Mapp has been universally
rejected. That is, that once a violation of search and seizure rules has
been found, evidence must be excluded. While United States v.
Leon182 has created a major exception to this principle when police
rely in good faith on a judicially-issued (but defective) search war-
rant, the mandatory rule otherwise remains in place here.1
8 3
Why do other countries seem to care more about improperly ob-
tained confessions than about illegal searches? The most likely rea-
son is that warnings about rights to counsel and silence, as well as
subsequent respect shown to the suspect's assertion of those rights,
adds to the courts' confidence in the reliability of the confession.
While every country excludes coerced confessions, there are lots of
confessions that, while not technically coerced, may nevertheless be
the product of the suspect's will having been overborne by police
pressure. Requirements of warnings, of police compliance with re-
quests for counsel and of tape recording, help to give courts confi-
"'o Id. at 377.
1s1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,474 (1966).
182 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
183 There is another exception, rarely applicable, for police reliance on a statute later de-
clared unconstitutional. See illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
2001]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW
dence that the confession is accurate. By contrast, real evidence is
not made any less reliable by police methods in obtaining it.
Still, in terms of the values being protected, having police, with
no probable cause and no warrant, bursting into one's house in the
middle of the night is obviously a greater interference with fundamen-
tal liberties than is failing to tell a suspect that he has a right to silence
and counsel, especially if, as in the U.S., this does not mean that
counsel is actually available. The answer of other countries to this
situation is that, if the police behavior constitutes a severe or purpose-
ful breach of civil liberties, then the evidence will be excluded. By
contrast, if the breach is a minor or technical violation of the rules
governing searches, evidentiary exclusion is not justified.
Is there anything about the United States that renders a mandatory
rule necessary here, when it is not thought to be needed in other coun-
tries? Certainly, a country with many minority groups, whose rights
are less likely to be respected by police, requires more detailed crimi-
nal procedure rules and tougher enforcement of those rules. But this
distinction was never valid for Argentina and South Africa, and is
increasing less applicable to the countries of western Europe which
are much more diverse than they used to be. Moreover, none of these
countries appears to have any alternative form of discipline for police
that is effective in preventing search violations.
So are these countries simply insensitive to violations of residen-
tial rights and behind the times in not adopting a mandatory exclu-
sionary rule? To some extent, I believe the answer to this question is
"Yes." In virtually all of the countries studied, there are examples of
clear breaches of search rules by police that should, from an Ameri-
can (i.e., my) viewpoint, have been sanctioned by evidentiary exclu-
sion but were not. On the other hand, it would be quite easy to find
many cases in the United States of courts excluding evidence for rela-
tively minor breaches of our incredibly complex Fourth Amendment
rules. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights, which
has generally been quite protective of the rights of criminal defen-
dants, rejecting the mandatory approach of Mapp, suggests that the
mandatory exclusionary rule should be reconsidered. 184 But any such
reconsideration should recognize that the countries discussed in this
Article have not necessarily adopted the ideal counter-approach.
184 As I have urged before. See Craig Bradley & Joseph Hoffman, Public Perception,
Justice, and the Search for Truth in Criminal Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1288 (1996).
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